Efficiency and Redistribution in Environmental Policy: An Equilibrium Analysis of Agricultural Supply Chains*

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Abstract

I build an empirical model of the South American agricultural sector to show how environmental policy is transmitted along a supply chain when regulation at the externality's source is infeasible. Given obstacles to a first-best carbon tax on farmers, I show how second-best alternatives—downstream agribusiness taxes—reduce upstream emissions but their effectiveness is limited by poor targeting, while also being regressive. Agribusiness monopsony power worsens targeting by lowering pass-through to upstream farmers in uncompetitive and emissions-intense regions, thus eroding the Pigouvian signal where social cost is highest. By contrast, small-scale but well-targeted upstream interventions perform robustly when markets face preexisting distortions.

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1 Introduction

In many of the major industries contributing to climate-change, the environmental externality often co-exists with other pre-existing distortions—market power being a case in point. How can we regulate such industries efficiently, and what are the distributional consequences of regulation? This paper provides an empirical framework to answer this question in the context of the South American agricultural sector, a global agricultural powerhouse with a major environmental impact, where the supply chain connecting farmers to consumers is intermediated by a concentrated agribusiness sector. A key feature of this setting is that agricultural emissions are mostly generated at the atomistic stage of the supply chain rather than at the concentrated stage. It is the millions of upstream farmers who make the environmentally-relevant decisions, mostly through their land-use choices, and not the large agribusiness firms further downstream. Given environmental policies are easier to implement and enforce at the concentrated end of the supply chain, this raises the question of how much of their Pigouvian signal is eroded before reaching the upstream farmers whose incentives they ultimately aim to correct.

The goal of this paper is to evaluate how the transmission of environmental policy occurs along a supply chain, in particular when pre-existing distortions lie between the stage where emissions are generated and the stage where regulation is feasible. The research challenge involves measuring the correlation between the two distortions of interest—the environmental externality and market power—and developing an equilibrium framework to study how they interact under different policy tools. To address this, I combine a variety of data sources to build a county-level panel of agricultural supply and demand, which I use to estimate an equilibrium model of the South American agricultural sector. On the model's supply side, I incorporate key margins determining emissions: how much land farmers deforest, which commodity they produce, and rich heterogeneity across the geographic locations where deforestation and production take place. On the demand side, I incorporate the funnel-like structure of agricultural supply chains: atomistic farmers at the upstream stage sell their output to a concentrated sector of downstream agribusiness firms with monopsony power.

Despite being a crucial item on the sustainable development agenda, environmental policy in developing world agriculture faces multiple obstacles. First, the distributional effects of an agricultural carbon tax are regressive on both demand and supply: poor households spend a larger share of their income on food, and farmers often lie at the bottom of the income distribution. Second, agricultural commodities are traded in highly integrated global markets, resulting in substantial "leakage" risk: if one country unilaterally sanctions its imports from an emissions-intense producer, the goods are diverted to non-regulated consumer markets and the externality remains uncorrected. Third, agricultural supply chains in developing countries are often fragmented, funnel-shaped, and subject to pre-existing distortions that may interfere with the performance of market-based policies. Beyond providing an ideal setting to study second-best environmental policy, agriculture is important in and of itself, accounting for 26% of global anthropogenic emissions (Poore and Nemecek, 2018). In particular, South American agricultural emissions are 27% of world agricultural emissions (FAOSTAT), exceeding those of major sectors of the US economy such as transport or electricity generation.[1]

On the measurement side, the key empirical result is that I estimate lower supply elasticities in frontier agricultural regions near densely forested areas. I obtain this result by modeling farmer decisions with a nested discrete choice model of land use that incorporates an extensive margin of converting forested land into *new* agricultural land, as well as the choice of which specific agricultural commodity to produce on *existing* agricultural land. Hence, the model incorporates the two key margins driving agricultural emissions within a single framework, while delivering estimates that are consistent with prior work estimating each margin separately. While I do not fully disentangle the microfoundations

[1] South American agricultural emissions have hovered around 3 Gt CO_2e since 1990. US emissions from industry, electricity, and transport in 2018 were 1.5 Gt, 1.8 Gt, and 1.9 Gt, respectively. (EPA, 2018)

for why supply is less elastic in remote regions, most potential mechanisms are related with these regions being less developed overall. One leading explanation for why farmers in remote regions are relatively sluggish in their production responses is they are more constrained in their access to the inputs required to adjust production.

For the model's demand side, I use granular data on domestic trade flows to document concentration among agribusiness intermediaries, a feature which I embed into my model with a layer of oligopsonistic intermediaries between farmers and final consumers. The farm-gate prices farmers receive are therefore marked down from the marginal revenue they generate for the intermediary, with the size of the markdown depending on two key objects: the supply elasticities of farmers and the degree of agribusiness concentration. Given the market power of intermediaries is stronger when facing inelastic farmers, the geographic heterogeneity in supply elasticities is inherited by the geographic distribution of monopsony power. Because remote regions are the most emissions-intense and have the least elastic supply, I find a positive spatial correlation between the degree of market power and the environmental externality's intensity.

The first part of my counterfactual analysis shows how a feasible environmental policy is transmitted along the supply chain. While a carbon tax at the emissions source, i.e., on upstream farmers, theoretically attains the first-best through the textbook Pigouvian mechanism, this type of policy is mostly absent in developing world agriculture due to logistical enforcement challenges as well as political infeasibility. Motivated by these constraints, I evaluate a policy that is feasible but second-best: a uniform tax (based on the average carbon content of each commodity across upstream producers) levied at the downstream stage on agribusiness firms. An international version of this is a carbon-border adjustment levied at the port, while a domestic version is a flat carbon tax at the retail stage. Given the spatial pattern of supply elasticities, the downstream tax ends up being spatially mistargeted because it causes production to drop least in remote upstream locations where the environmental cost is highest. Because of inelastic supply, these remote regions are also where farm-gate prices drop most. Since these locations are among the poorest, the distributional effects of a downstream tax are regressive on the supply-side: the income of poor farmers is implicitly taxed at a higher rate than that of rich farmers. Finally, because the tax needs to be passed through the supply chain to farmers to shift their production incentives, agribusiness monopsony power plays a role by reducing pass-through and eroding the upstream transmission of the Pigouvian signal.[2]

The second part of my counterfactual analysis shows how a regulatory agency's optimal choice of policy instrument depends on the previously mentioned spatial correlation between market power and emissions intensity. Downstream policies, such as the taxes from the first part of my analysis, are mistargeted because they do not take into account the spatial heterogeneity in emissions intensities across upstream farmers. Moreover, market power worsens targeting by lowering pass-through most to the least competitive upstream locations, which are also the most emissions-intense. By contrast, policies that are directly implemented upstream, such as a forest subsidy, are better targeted and robust to market structure because they avoid the pass-through distortions the downstream tax is subject to. However, these policies come with an enforcement cost that limits their scalability. Thus, the regulator faces a trade-off between targeting and scale when choosing between the two types of tools, with the starkness of the trade-off depending on the correlation between market power and the environmental externality. If the correlation is positive, as I find in my setting, market power worsens the targeting of the downstream tax, thus favoring direct implementation upstream (even if at small scale). If the correlation were negative, as it could well be in other empirical contexts, then market power would improve targeting by raising pass-through where environmental cost is highest. These qualitative results on the role of market power for the transmission of environmen-

[2] Theoretically, pass-through in an imperfectly competitive market can be incomplete, complete, or more than complete, depending on the curvature of the side of the market subject to market power (Bulow and Pfleiderer, 1983; Weyl and Fabinger, 2013). In a monopoly problem this is determined by the curvature of demand, while in a monopsony problem the relevant analogue is the curvature of supply. In my empirical setting the log-curvature of supply is such that monopsony power delivers incomplete pass-through.

tal policy add nuance to the classic intuition that by depressing quantities "the monopolist is the conservationist's friend" (Solow, 1974).

In terms of related literature, this paper contributes to the intersection of industrial organization and environmental economics (Buchanan, 1969; Ryan, 2012; Fowlie, Reguant and Ryan, 2016) by showing that market power can be ambiguous for the *transmission* of environmental policy. The sufficient statistic that resolves this ambiguity is the correlation between the two distortions—the degree of market power and the environmental externality's intensity—since it determines *where* the pass-through of the Pigouvian signal is strongest. Moreover, by focusing on how firms exercise market power on their upstream suppliers I open a distributional channel on the supply side that contrasts with most work on environmental policy incidence on consumers (Bento, Goulder, Jacobsen and Von Haefen, 2009; Fabra and Reguant, 2014). Second, my paper connects the agricultural trade literature (Costinot, Donaldson and Smith, 2016; Sotelo, 2020; Pellegrina, 2022) to the land-use change literature from agricultural economics (Roberts and Schlenker, 2013; Scott, 2013; Souza-Rodrigues, 2019). The trade literature uses the Ricardian framework of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to study how different commodities are allocated across existing agricultural land, but abstracts from the extensive margin of land conversion. By contrast, the land-use studies typically model the land-use change margin as binary—land is either left in its natural forested state or used for agriculture broadly defined—but abstracts from which specific commodities are produced. My nested model incorporates both choice margins. Third, this paper relates to a growing literature in trade and the environment (Conte, 2020; Conte, Desmet, Nagy and Rossi-Hansberg, 2021; Nath, 2025; Cruz and Rossi-Hansberg, 2024; Copeland, Shapiro and Taylor, 2022; Kortum and Weisbach, 2017; Farrokhi and Lashkaripour, 2021; Hsiao, 2021). I contribute by focusing on the policy implications of the interaction between market power and the spatial heterogeneity in emissions intensities. Finally, this paper relates to recent studies on monopsony power in developing economies (Mitra, Mookherjee, Torero and Visaria, 2018; Bergquist and Dinerstein, 2020; Chatterjee, 2023; Rubens, 2023; Dhingra and Tenreyro, 2020; Zavala, 2021), most of which focuses on the welfare impacts of market power per se. Instead, I incorporate market power to understand how it interferes with environmental policy.

2 Data

I construct a county-level panel of agricultural supply and demand from 1995-2017 using various data sources from Argentina and Brazil. The supply side consists of a county-level panel of land use, agricultural output, yields, and farm-gate prices for beef cattle, soybeans, maize, wheat, rice, sunflower, and sugarcane. On the demand side I connect each county's production to its nation-level destination markets using trade flow data.

Geographic unit of analysis and temporal frequency. The Argentine data is reported at the department level ("partidos"). For Brazil I use time-consistent spatial units from Ehrl (2017): "Areas Minimas Comparaveis" (AMC). Hence, the term "counties" refers to Argentine departments and Brazilian AMCs.[3] Given most of the data is from decadal agricultural censuses, changes over time are interpreted as long-run changes.

Land-use and agricultural output. County-level land use data is from decadal agricultural censuses of Argentina and Brazil. For Argentina, I complement the census with the Ministry of Agriculture's "Datos Agroindustriales" database (DA-MAGYP). Output data on crops and livestock for Argentina is from the census, DA-MAGYP, and the phytosanitary authority (SENASA), while for Brazil it is from the census and two municipal surveys: Produção Agrícola Municipal (PAM) and Pesquisa da Pecuária Municipal (PPM).

Agronomic productivity. High spatial resolution agricultural productivity data is from FAO-GAEZ (IIASA/FAO, 2012) and is reported as potential yields predicted from agro-climatic fundamentals.[4] To calibrate the model's productivity parameters I complement

[3]Argentina has 512 "counties" with an average size of 0.5 Mha (million hectares), while Brazil has 4,298 with an average size of 0.2 Mha. For comparison, the US has 3,243 counties with an average size of 0.3 Mha.

[4]To obtain "yields" for cattle I construct a measure of cattle productivity by projecting the FAO-GAEZ pasture index on county-level cattle stocking rates from agricultural censuses (see Appendix B.1).

FAO-GAEZ with realized yields from the output and land-use datasets reported above. I use national-level data on extreme temperature from FAOSTAT to obtain temporal variation in agricultural productivity induced by weather shocks.

Trade flows. National-level trade flows of commodities are from FAOSTAT. To determine sourcing within Argentina and Brazil I use domestic supply chain data from TRASE, which is constructed from customs records and maps annual trade flows (in physical quantities and FOB values) from source counties to national-level destination markets, as well as to the agribusiness firms intermediating the transactions. In Appendix B.2 I provide a detailed description of the TRASE data and validate it against conventional data sources such as FAOSTAT. For the beef sector in Argentina I complement TRASE with meatpacker procurement records from DA-MAGYP.

Prices. Farm-gate prices are obtained from production value and quantity data. For Brazil, the sources are the census and PAM. For Argentina I use DA-MAGYP. Destination prices are from TRASE quantities and free-on-board (FOB) values. Since values are reported as port of export FOB, destination prices reflect the price the agribusiness firms receive for delivery up to the port of export, but not to the final destination market. Therefore, destination prices include domestic transport costs from farm to port, but not international costs to final destination (which are paid by final destination consumers).

Emissions. I compute land-use change emissions using carbon density maps constructed from biomass data by Spawn and Gibbs (2020). For commodity-specific on-farm emissions intensities I use life-cycle-assessment values from Poore and Nemecek (2018).

3 Stylized facts

First, I provide background on agricultural emissions, emphasizing how the upstream decisions of farmers are the main driver of emissions footprints. Second, I present summary statistics highlighting the funnel-shape of agricultural supply chains, introducing the notion that regulation is easier to enforce at the funnel's downstream bottleneck. Third, I show how land use patterns have evolved across time and space in my setting, highlighting how multiple commodities compete with each other and shape aggregate land use through comparative advantage. Finally, I describe how these features interact to motivate the key ingredients of my model and the policy counterfactuals I run.

Fact 1: Agricultural emissions are primarily determined by three choice margins, all of which take place at the upstream stage of the supply chain.

The first key determinant of agricultural emissions is the amount of land being cleared for production. Over 80% of agricultural emissions are generated upstream before the commodities leave the farm-gate, mostly due to land-use change and on-farm sources such as enteric methane (Figure 1-A). The land-use share is especially high in South America, above 70%, compared to a world average of 40% (FAOSTAT). The upstream feature of agricultural emissions contrasts with fossil fuels, where emissions are primarily released downstream at the point of consumption (i.e., the burning of fuel for energy).

Figure 1: Sources of agricultural emissions along the supply chain.



Notes: panel A shows emissions footprints (global averages) using publicly available data from Poore and Nemecek (2018). See Appendix Figure 10 for footprints per kcal or protein content. Panel B shows aboveground carbon density constructed from biomass data from Spawn and Gibbs (2020).

The second key determinant is the specific commodity being produced. Emissions footprints vary widely across commodities, even after factoring in differing land requirements (Figure 1-A). For example, beef contains 25 times more CO_2e/kg of protein than plant-based high-protein alternatives, largely due to enteric methane emissions unique to ruminants. The third key determinant is the location where land clearing and production take place: emissions footprints vary widely across space due to the highly uneven geographic distribution of carbon stocks (Figure 1-B).

Fact 2: Agricultural supply chains are funnel-shaped, as atomistic upstream farmers face a concentrated sector of downstream agribusiness buyers.

Farmers do not access consumer markets directly, but rather through intermediating agribusiness firms. In Brazil there are 2.4 million upstream ranching establishments, 79% of which hold less than 50 head of cattle, facing a concentrated sector of downstream agribusiness firms. In the median county, the top three agribusiness firms account for 95% of sourced beef, with the top firm accounting for over 60% (Table 1).

Table 2 shows how agribusiness concentration correlates across upstream markets with a crude accounting-based markdown—the ratio of the farm-gate price with respect to the price the agribusiness firm receives at the port. Given this gap is partly driven by transport costs, I control for an upstream location's remoteness with a standard market access measure. The correlation is negative: farm-gate prices are marked-down more in upstream markets with a higher concentration of buyers, even after controlling for remoteness. Moreover, the relationship is robust to the spatial granularity at which upstream markets are defined. Needless to say, these empirical patterns should *not* be interpreted as a causal relationship from market concentration to market outcomes. Concentration is itself a market outcome, and just like prices and markdowns it is determined by supply and demand primitives (Bresnahan, 1989). In a setting with potential monopsony power the key primitive is the supply elasticity of farmers, which I estimate. Given supply elasticities are shaped by land use decisions, we now turn to the drivers of land use.

Table 1: Agribusiness concentration in upstream markets.

	Brazil			Argentina
	Beef	Maize	Soybean	Soybean
Number of agricultural establishments (sellers)	2,457,512	1,619,880	236,141	42,428
Number of agribusiness firms (buyers)	134	110	188	32
CR-1 (national market)	0.34	0.18	0.15	0.13
CR-3 (national market)	0.68	0.46	0.42	0.36
CR-1 (median across local upstream markets)	0.66	1.00	1.00	0.18
CR-3 (median across local upstream markets)	0.94	1.00	1.00	0.43
Share of upstream markets with only 1 agribusiness firm	0.14	0.86	0.73	0.01

Notes: upstream markets are defined at the county-level and for 2017, the latest year. Agricultural establishment data is from censuses. All other data is from TRASE. CR-N is the top-N firm concentration ratio.

Table 2: Upstream market concentration and accounting-based markdowns.

	farm-gate price/agribusiness price ratio					
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
CR-3	**-0.061***	**-0.062***	**-0.152*****	**-0.155*****	**-0.082*****	**-0.082*****
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Market definition	Mesoregion	Mesoregion	Microregion	Microregion	AMC	AMC
Control for market access	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓
Observations	260	260	899	899	4,663	4,663

Notes: regressions are at the upstream market-level for various degrees of spatial granularity across columns. Farm-gate prices are from censuses and production surveys. Agribusiness prices are TRASE FOB prices. CR-3 is the 3-firm concentration ratio. A location's market access is its mean distance to surrounding hubs (weighted by hub size), defined as $MA_i = \sum_j s_j d_{ij}^{-1}$ where d_{ij} is distance between upstream market i-hub j and s_j is the hub's share of national exports. HC-robust SE reported in parenthesis.

Fact 3: Agricultural commodities compete with each other in local land markets, shaping aggregate land use patterns through comparative advantage.

One of the key developments in South American agriculture over recent decades has been the dramatic expansion of soybean production (Figure 2-A). Growing international demand, especially from Asia, has been a major driver behind such trends: over 70% of soybean output is exported and over 50% of exports go to Asia (FAOSTAT). By crowding out other commodities, the soybean boom has resulted in a reallocation of agricultural production across land markets. Cattle grazing has shifted from soybean-suitable areas (central-south Brazil, mid-east Argentina) to cheaper land markets in frontier agricultural regions (northern Brazil, north and west Argentina). While soybean expansion may not directly lead to deforestation, it can do so indirectly by displacing land-intensive cattle grazing to frontier regions where the forests lie, as reflected by Figure 2-B-C-D. Accounting for interactions between commodities is therefore crucial for understanding deforestation in the South American context. In this setting, the most land-use-relevant commodities are beef cattle (pasture), soybeans, and maize—they account for 85% of all agricultural land, with pasture alone representing 70%.

Figure 2: The South American soybean boom across time and space.



Notes: upper panel shows total acreage allocated to major crops in Argentina and Brazil between 1990-2018. Lower panel shows county-level changes in acreage allocated to soybeans, pasture, and forest between 1995-2017. Sources: agricultural censuses, DA-MAGYP (Argentina), PAM (Brazil).

Implications for model specification and policy counterfactuals

Fact 1 suggests deforestation, commodity choice, and production location are key margins driving agricultural emissions. Hence, I propose a model where farmers make decisions along two emissions-relevant margins—how much land to clear and which commodity to produce—in a setting with rich spatial heterogeneity. Having different commodities compete for land allows comparative advantage to shape aggregate land use, in line with fact 3. I model agribusiness firms as oligopsonists in upstream markets given they may plausibly hold market power as buyers, in line with fact 2. This specification nests the perfectly competitive case in order to alternate between conduct assumptions and evaluate how market power affects the transmission of environmental policy.

The stylized facts suggest that if the externality's source is upstream and atomistically heterogeneous, but the downstream stage is concentrated and easier to regulate, then policymakers face a trade-off between efficient upstream targeting and ease of implementation downstream. This contrasts with sectors such as electricity, where fossil-fuel emissions are concentrated downstream among a few large firms, making targeted enforcement at the emissions source logistically easier. While a carbon tax on farmers is the theoretically efficient solution, in practice it faces political barriers and requires enforcement capacity due to the atomized nature of production. In reality, policy design revolves around a range of second-best options at different stages of the supply chain.

Upstream policies often take the form of a conservation zone, which due to monitoring costs can only be implemented for a narrow set of locations.[5] By contrast, downstream tools can operate at scale because they avoid such enforcement costs: they are implemented at the supply chain's bottleneck (e.g., a tariff at the port) and then leverage the market mechanism to deliver a Pigouvian signal at scale to upstream farmers. However, for a downstream tax to be efficiently targeted it requires precise tracing of the commod-

[5]One of the better known policies in this category is Brazil's "Priority Municipality List", in which IBAMA (Brazil's environmental protection agency) increased monitoring for a subset of high-deforestation municipalities in the Amazon (Assunção, McMillan, Murphy and Souza-Rodrigues, 2023).

ity's upstream origin, a condition that is not always satisfied in our setting.[6] This leaves us with a uniform downstream tax based on an average emissions footprint, regardless of the emissions-intensity of the commodity's origin. Given small-scale upstream regulation (e.g., conservation zones) and large-scale but coarsely targeted downstream taxes (e.g., tariffs or domestic retail taxes) are often proposed in this policy space, I design my policy counterfactuals to show how they are traded-off against each other in terms of their targeting and scale properties, and how market power shapes this trade-off.

4 Model

4.1 Upstream supply

Every county i contains a continuum of fields indexed ω, each of which is owned by a landowner. In each period t, the landowner selects a land use from a discrete choice set consisting of a natural use option $\mathcal{N}$ and a nest of agricultural commodities $\mathcal{C}$. If the landowner allocates her field to a commodity $c \in \mathcal{C}$, she does so by renting the land to a farmer, who combines it with labor and intermediate inputs to produce the commodity.

4.1.1 Farmer's optimization problem

Production technology. I model the farmer's optimization problem over factors by following the recent literature (Sotelo, 2020; Farrokhi and Pellegrina, 2023). Let $L^c_{it}(\omega)$ denote the size of the field ω that a farmer rents from a landowner to produce commodity c. The farmer combines land with hired workers $H^c_{it}(\omega)$ and an intermediate input $M^c_{it}(\omega)$

[6] For empirical evidence on challenges Brazilian authorities face in monitoring farmers and meatpackers face in tracing the origin (and carbon content) of their cattle purchases, see Barreto, Pereira, Jr. and Baima (2017); Pereira, Rausch, Carrara and Gibbs (2020); Skidmore, Moffette, Rausch, Christie, Munger and Gibbs (2021). Appendix E.1.1 provides further details on certification challenges in the beef supply chain.

using a Cobb-Douglas technology that delivers $Q_{it}^{c}(\omega)$ physical units of commodity c,

$$Q_{it}^{c}(\omega)=\bar{q}\left[A_{it}^{c}(\omega)L_{it}^{c}(\omega)\right]^{\gamma_L^c}\left[H_{it}^{c}(\omega)\right]^{\gamma_H^c}\left[M_{it}^{c}(\omega)\right]^{\gamma_M^c}\quad\text{where}\quad A_{it}^{c}(\omega)=A_{it}^{c}\exp\left(\varepsilon_{it}^{c}(\omega)\right).$$

$A_{it}^{c}(\omega)$ is land productivity, consisting of a county-i mean A_{it}^{c} and a field-ω idiosyncratic shock $\varepsilon_{it}^{c}(\omega)$, $\bar{q}\equiv(\gamma_L^c)^{-\gamma_L^c}(\gamma_H^c)^{-\gamma_H^c}(\gamma_M^c)^{-\gamma_M^c}$ is a scalar, and $\gamma_L^c+\gamma_H^c+\gamma_M^c=1$.

Factor demand and unit cost function. Let p_{it}^{c} denote the farm-gate price a farmer receives per unit of commodity c. On the cost side, let $r_{it}^{c}(\omega)$ denote the rent paid by the farmer for a unit of land on field ω, and let w_{Hit} and w_{Mit} denote the wage per worker and the price of the intermediate input. Taking output and factor prices as given, the farmer's cost-minimization problem delivers demand for labor and intermediates as $H_{it}^{c}(\omega)=\frac{r_{it}^{c}(\omega)}{w_{Hit}}\frac{\gamma_H^c}{\gamma_L^c}$ and $M_{it}^{c}(\omega)=\frac{r_{it}^{c}(\omega)}{w_{Mit}}\frac{\gamma_M^c}{\gamma_L^c}$. Moreover, the unit cost of production on field ω is given by $\kappa_{it}^{c}(\omega)=(w_{Hit})^{\gamma_H^c}(w_{Mit})^{\gamma_M^c}\left(\frac{r_{it}^{c}(\omega)}{A_{it}^{c}(\omega)}\right)^{\gamma_L^c}$.

4.1.2 Landowner's land use choice problem

Landowner payoff from each commodity. Farmer profits are zero in equilibrium, resulting in a zero profit condition $p_{it}^{c}=\kappa_{it}^{c}(\omega)$ from which we can back out the rent per unit of land on field ω—the landowner's payoff when her field is allocated to commodity c—as $r_{it}^{c}(\omega)=r_{it}^{c}\exp(\varepsilon_{it}^{c}(\omega))$ where $r_{it}^{c}\equiv A_{it}^{c}\left(p_{it}^{c}\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma_L^c}}(w_{Hit})^{-\frac{\gamma_H^c}{\gamma_L^c}}(w_{Mit})^{-\frac{\gamma_M^c}{\gamma_L^c}}$ is the county-level non-idiosyncratic component of landowner payoffs.

Landowner payoff from the natural use option. Let $A_{it}^{\mathcal{N}}(\omega)=A_{it}^{\mathcal{N}}\exp(\varepsilon_{it}^{\mathcal{N}}(\omega))$ be the landowner's payoff per unit of land when the field is left in its natural state, consisting of a county-i mean $A_{it}^{\mathcal{N}}$ and a field-ω idiosyncratic shock $\varepsilon_{it}^{\mathcal{N}}(\omega)$. $A_{it}^{\mathcal{N}}(\omega)$ captures the dollar-value of any incentives landowners have to keep part of their land forested, some of which may be non-pecuniary (e.g., ecosystem services provided by forests that are privately valued by landowners, such as prevention of soil erosion, flood risk mitigation).

Observability of payoffs. Concretely, the discrete choice problem of landowner ω is,

$$\max_{\{1, \ldots c, \ldots, C, \mathcal{N}\}} \left[r_{it}^{1} \exp(\varepsilon_{it}^{1}(\omega)), \ldots, r_{it}^{C} \exp(\varepsilon_{it}^{C}(\omega)), A_{it}^{\mathcal{N}} \exp(\varepsilon_{it}^{\mathcal{N}}(\omega)) \right]. \tag{1}$$

Apart from the idiosyncratic shocks, the econometrician does not observe $A_{it}^{\mathcal{N}}$, so it will be estimated. I allow county-level productivity (in the r_{it}^{c} term) to be decomposed as $A_{it}^{c} = z_{it}^{c} \zeta_{it}^{c}$, where z_{it}^{c} is observable (as measured by agronomic yields) while ζ_{it}^{c} is not.

Nesting assumption. I assume the idiosyncratic shocks are distributed Generalized Extreme Value (McFadden, 1977; Goldberg, 1995; Train, 2009). This delivers a nested structure that allows shocks to be more correlated within nests than across. The GEV distribution has two key parameters: θ governs the variance of shocks while $\lambda \in (0,1)$ governs their correlation within nest $\mathcal{C}$. Higher values of θ correspond to lower variance, and higher values of λ to lower correlation. Appendix A.1-A.2 provides a discussion of how the textbook formulation of the GEV distribution maps to the land use model.

Share of land allocated to each land use. Let $\pi_{it}^{c|\mathcal{C}}$ be the probability commodity c is chosen conditional on choosing nest $\mathcal{C}$, while $\pi_{it}^{\mathcal{C}}$ is the probability of choosing nest $\mathcal{C}$. Under our distributional assumptions we have a closed form for these objects,

$$\pi_{it}^{c|\mathcal{C}} = \frac{\left(r_{it}^{c}\right)^{\frac{\theta}{\lambda}}}{\sum_{c' \in \mathcal{C}} \left(r_{it}^{c'}\right)^{\frac{\theta}{\lambda}}} \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_{it}^{\mathcal{C}} = \frac{\left(P_{it}^{\mathcal{C}}\right)^{\lambda}}{(A_{it}^{\mathcal{N}})^{\theta} + \left(P_{it}^{\mathcal{C}}\right)^{\lambda}} \quad \text{with} \quad P_{it}^{\mathcal{C}} \equiv \sum_{c' \in \mathcal{C}} \left(r_{it}^{c'}\right)^{\frac{\theta}{\lambda}}. \tag{2}$$

$P_{it}^{\mathcal{C}}$ is defined as the payoff of the agricultural nest. Technically, $\ln P_{it}^{\mathcal{C}}$ is the nest's inclusive value in the nested logit model. The share of land allocated to natural use is $\pi_{it}^{\mathcal{N}} = 1 - \pi_{it}^{\mathcal{C}}$.

Quantity supplied. Unconditional choice probabilities can be written as $\pi_{it}^{c} = \pi_{it}^{c|\mathcal{C}} \pi_{it}^{\mathcal{C}}$. Given a county's total surface $\bar{L}_i$, its total acreage of commodity c is $L_{it}^{c} = \pi_{it}^{c} \bar{L}_i$. Moreover, we have a closed form for the county-level supply of commodity c,

$$Q_{it}^{c} = \int_{\omega} Q_{it}^{c}(\omega) d\omega = \tilde{r}_{it}^{c} \left(\pi_{it}^{c|\mathcal{C}}\right)^{-\frac{\lambda}{\theta}} \left(\pi_{it}^{\mathcal{C}}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} L_{it}^{c}, \tag{3}$$

where $\tilde{r}^c_{it} \equiv r^c_{it}/p^c_{it}\gamma^c_L$. As $\lambda \to 1$, correlation between commodities disappears and the nested model collapses to a multinomial model (Costinot et al., 2016; Sotelo, 2020). The nested structure is important because a multinomial model restricts substitution between commodities to be just as easy as substitution between natural and agricultural use.

Demand and supply of non-land factors. The farmer's optimization problem delivers demand for non-land factors at the field-level. Integrating over fields delivers county-level aggregates, $H^c_{it} = \gamma^c_H \frac{p^c_{it}Q^c_{it}}{w_{Hit}}$ and $M^c_{it} = \gamma^c_M \frac{p^c_{it}Q^c_{it}}{w_{Mit}}$. As for the supply of non-land factors, I assume labor is mobile across sectors but not across locations. Each location has an exogenous endowment of workers $\overline{H}_{it}$ that endogenously chooses between agriculture and non-agriculture. I assume the worker's sectoral choice problem follows a Roy specification where the share of workers supplying labor to agriculture is $s_{H|it} = \frac{w^{\psi}_{Hit}}{w^{\psi}_{Hit}+\underline{w}^{\psi}_{Hit}}$, where ψ is the across-sector substitution elasticity and $\underline{w}_{Hit}$ is the non-agricultural wage. Effective labor units supply to agriculture is therefore $s^{(\psi-1)/\psi}_{H|it}\overline{H}_{it}$. As for the intermediate input, I assume it is imported from abroad at price $w_{Mit} = w_{Mt}\tau_i$, where w_{Mt} is the international price and τ_i is a domestic trade cost to county i from its nearest port.[7]

4.2 Downstream demand

The demand side consists of two layers. First, agribusiness intermediaries buy commodities from upstream farmers in source counties indexed $i \in \mathcal{I}$. Second, these intermediaries sell the commodity (either in raw format or partially processed) to final consumers in destinations indexed $j \in \mathcal{J}$. Intermediaries hold market power as buyers in the upstream market, but take prices as given in the downstream consumer market.

Agribusiness intermediaries. There are N^c_{it} identical agribusiness intermediary firms, each purchasing q^c_{it} units of raw commodity c from source i. Farmers do not perceive the

[7] Appendix D.5.3 provides an extension with migration across counties and discusses implications for the main policy analysis. The assumption that the intermediate is not produced domestically is motivated by the import share of agricultural inputs being especially high in Latin America. The region has one of the world's highest import shares of fertilizers (76%) as well as machinery (68%), significantly higher than North America, Europe, Asia, and only surpassed by Sub-Saharan Africa (Farrokhi and Pellegrina, 2023).

firms as differentiated buyers, hence all firms buy the commodity at the same farm-gate price p_{it}^{c}. Apart from transporting commodities from an upstream source i to a downstream destination j, I allow firms to add value by transforming q_{it}^{c} units of raw commodity c into a processed product k via a technology $f(q_{it}^{c};k)$. For example, from a raw commodity c = soybeans, a firm could produce k = soybean oil or k'=soybean meal. In the case where the firm does not transform the commodity and trades it raw, I set $k = c$ so that the "product" is simply the raw commodity, and therefore $f(q_{it}^{c};c) = q_{it}^{c}$.

The firm sells product k at the port closest to source county i, obtaining a FOB price $\bar{p}_{it}^{k}$. Hence, transport costs from port to final destination are paid by final consumers: a destination j consumer pays $p_{ijt}^{k} = \bar{p}_{it}^{k}\tau_{ij}$, where τ_{ij} is an iceberg trade cost. We can now pose each firm's maximization problem, taking demand of the other firms as given,

$$\max_{q_{it}^{c}} \quad \bar{p}_{it}^{k} f(q_{it}^{c};k) - p_{it}^{c}\left(Q_{it}^{c}\right) q_{it}^{c},$$

where q_{it}^{c} is an individual firm's demand for raw commodity c, Q_{it}^{c} is total demand, and $p_{it}^{c}\left(Q_{it}^{c}\right)$ is source i's inverse supply equation. From the first order conditions, the farm-gate price p_{it}^{c}—which is the marginal cost from the intermediary's point of view—is a fraction $\mu_{it}^{c} < 1$ of the marginal revenue the commodity generates for the intermediary,

$$\underbrace{p_{it}^{c}}_{\text{marginal cost}} = \underbrace{\mu_{it}^{c}}_{\text{markdown}} \times \underbrace{\bar{p}_{it}^{k}\, f'(q_{it}^{c};k)}_{\text{marginal revenue}} \quad \text{where} \quad \mu_{it}^{c} \equiv \left(1 + \frac{\partial \ln p_{it}^{c}}{\partial \ln Q_{it}^{c}} \frac{1}{N_{it}^{c}}\right)^{-1} < 1. \tag{4}$$

A farmer from source i obtains μ_{it}^{c} cents for every dollar the intermediary makes from transforming commodity c into product k. I define μ_{it}^{c}, the ratio of the raw commodity's farm-gate price to its marginal revenue, as the markdown. Markdowns follow an inverse-elasticity rule: farmers with inelastic supply are subject to wide markdowns (low μ_{it}^{c}). The setup of the intermediary problem is purposefully simple, with the goal of obtaining the smallest departure from the perfectly competitive setting typically assumed by the agricultural trade literature as well as parsimoniously nest it. In the limiting cases of perfect competition ($\mu_{it}^c = 1$) and raw commodity trade ($f(q_{it}^c, c) = q_{it}^c$), the farm-gate price is equal to the FOB price and the destination market price is simply the farm-gate price adjusted by trade costs, i.e., $p_{ijt}^c = p_{it}^c \tau_{ij}$. I present model extensions with firm heterogeneity and exit/entry in Appendix A.4.

Consumers. I follow the standard approach from the agricultural trade literature to model consumers: a multi-level CES demand system with differentiation across products and sources and bilateral iceberg trade costs τ_{ij}. Each destination j has a representative consumer with a three-level CES utility function. In the upper level, consumers substitute between products indexed k (e.g., maize vs. wheat). In the middle level, they substitute between source nations n of a given commodity (e.g., Brazilian maize vs. US maize). In the lower level, they substitute between counties i within a nation (e.g., maize from Northern vs. Southern Brazil).[8] These preferences deliver the following demand by a destination j consumer for product k from county i in nation n,

$$C_{ijt}^k = a_{ijt}^k \left(\frac{p_{ijt}^k}{P_{njt}^k} \right)^{-\eta_l} a_{njt}^k \left(\frac{P_{njt}^k}{P_{jt}^k} \right)^{-\eta_m} a_{jt}^k \left(\frac{P_{jt}^k}{P_{jt}} \right)^{-\eta_u} \frac{X_{jt}}{P_{jt}} \quad \forall i \in n, \tag{5}$$

where η_l, η_m, and η_u are the lower, middle, and upper level elasticities of substitution, p_{ijt}^k is the lower level price, the a terms are preference shifters, X_{jt} is destination j expenditure on agricultural goods (which is exogenous since this is a single-industry model) and the P terms are price indices at each level of the demand system: $P_{njt}^k \equiv \left(\sum_{i' \in n} a_{i'jt}^k (p_{i'jt}^k)^{1-\eta_l} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta_l}}$, $P_{jt}^k \equiv \left(\sum_n a_{njt}^k (P_{njt}^k)^{1-\eta_m} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta_m}}$, and $P_{jt} \equiv \left(\sum_c a_{jt}^k (P_{jt}^k)^{1-\eta_u} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta_u}}$. Given this is a standard

[8] Consumers in this model are interpreted as the first agents to receive the commodity at the destination's entry point (typically food processing companies that transform commodities into retail food products). Hence, the different levels of the CES system should *not* be interpreted as the degree to which final retail consumers literally differentiate as a matter of taste—indeed, it is unlikely they perceive significant quality differences between maize from one county versus another. Instead, imperfect substitution in the lower-level may reflect the degree to which there are frictions in sourcing from one county versus another (e.g., unobserved switching costs across suppliers) even if the underlying product being sourced from both counties is identical. This allows a finite substitution elasticity at the lower-level while allowing the interpretation that consumers do not literally differentiate products across origins.

CES consumer problem, its derivation is relegated to Appendix A.3.

4.3 Equilibrium

An equilibrium is a vector of farm-gate prices $\{p^c_{it}\}_{i,c}$ and wages $\{w_{Hit}\}_i$ such that,

1. commodity supply in each county equals total demand: $Q^c_{it}(p^c_{it}) = \sum_j C^c_{ijt}(p^k_{ijt})\tau_{ij}$ $\forall i, c$, where $p^k_{ijt} = \frac{p^c_{it}}{\mu^c_{it}} \frac{\tau_{ij}}{f'(q^c_{it};k)}$.[9]

2. agricultural labor supply in each county equals local labor demand across all commodities: $s_{H|it}\left(w_{Hit}, \underline{w}_{Hit}\right)^{(\psi-1)/\psi} \overline{H}_{it} = \sum_c H^c_{it}\left(w_{Hit}, w_{Mit}, p^c_{it}\right)$.

I solve the equilibrium using an iterative algorithm that exploits the monotonicity of the excess demand function in output and factor markets (see Appendix D.2 for details).

Emissions externality. I allow emissions to originate from two sources: i) land use change (LUC) emissions from clearing forested land, and ii) non-LUC emissions that result from the on-farm production process (e.g., fertilizer use, enteric methane from cattle). Non-LUC emissions vary by commodity, hence switching between commodities affects total emissions even if there is no deforestation. Because agricultural production releases many types of greenhouse gases (CO_2, CH_4, etc.) I use CO_2-equivalent units (CO_2e) throughout the analysis. Let $e^{c,NLUC}_i$ denote the non-LUC emissions intensity of commodity c (tonnes of non-LUC CO_2e per tonne of output). Let e^{LUC}_i denote the LUC emissions intensity of location i (CO_2e stock per hectare of land). Values for $e^{c,NLUC}_i$ are taken from the life cycle assessment literature (Poore and Nemecek, 2018) while values for e^{LUC}_i are from the carbon stock maps described in section 2. I denote emissions from LUC and

[9] When k is not a raw commodity, demand C^k_{ijt} from 5 is in units of processed product k, but supply Q^c_{it} is in units of raw commodity c. To define market clearing, we convert demand to raw commodity-equivalent units, C^c_{ijt}. Let m^{ck}_{it} denote the units of product k produced with one unit of commodity c ($m^{cc}_{it} = 1$) and let $\mathcal{K}(c)$ be the set of products produced from c. Then, demand expressed in units of raw commodity c is,

$$C^c_{ijt}(p^k_{ijt}) = \begin{cases} C^k_{ijt}(p^k_{ijt}) & \text{if } \mathcal{K}(c) = \{c\}, \\ \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}(c)} C^k_{ijt}(p^k_{ijt}) / m^{ck}_{it} & \text{if } \mathcal{K}(c) = \{c\} \cup \{k, k+1, \ldots\}, \end{cases} \tag{6}$$

non-LUC sources in location i as E_i^{LUC} and $E_i^{c,NLUC}$. The *change* in location i's emissions between two counterfactual equilibria is computed from changes in land and output as $\Delta E_i = \Delta E_i^{LUC} + \sum_c \Delta E_i^{c,NLUC}$, where $\Delta E_i^{LUC} = \Delta L_i^{\mathcal{C}} e_i^{LUC}$ and $\Delta E_i^{c,NLUC} = \Delta Q_i^c e_i^{c,NLUC}$. The dollar-value of emissions is obtained by multiplying emissions quantities by the social cost of carbon (SCC), for which I use a baseline value of 50 USD/t of CO_2e.

5 Estimation

5.1 Supply elasticities

Within-nest substitution elasticities. To clarify the variation I use to estimate the supply-side parameters, consider the odds ratio between two land use choices c and $c' \in \mathcal{C}$,

$$\ln\left(\frac{\pi_{it}^c}{\pi_{it}^{c'}}\right) = \frac{\theta}{\lambda}\ln\left(\frac{r_{it}^c}{r_{it}^{c'}}\right) = \frac{\theta}{\lambda}\ln\left(\frac{\left(p_{it}^c\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma_L^c}} z_{it}^c}{\left(p_{it}^{c'}\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma_L^{c'}}} z_{it}^{c'}}\right) + u_{it}^{cc'}, \tag{7}$$

where the second equality is obtained by substituting the expression for r_{it}^c from section 4.1.2. The first term on the right of 7 is a combination of objects that are observable to the econometrician: farm-gate prices p_{it}^c, land intensities γ_L^c, and the observable component of land productivity z_{it}^c (yields). The second term is a combination of unobservables defined as $u_{it}^{cc'} \equiv \frac{\theta}{\lambda}\left[\ln\left(\frac{\zeta_{it}^c}{\zeta_{it}^{c'}}\right) + \ln\left(w_{Hit}^{\gamma_{HL}^{cc'}} w_{Mit}^{\gamma_{ML}^{cc'}}\right)\right]$ where $\gamma_{HL}^{cc'} \equiv -\frac{\gamma_H^c}{\gamma_L^c} + \frac{\gamma_H^{c'}}{\gamma_L^{c'}}$ and $\gamma_{ML}^{cc'} \equiv -\frac{\gamma_M^c}{\gamma_L^c} + \frac{\gamma_M^{c'}}{\gamma_L^{c'}}$. This term contains unobservable shocks to land productivity ζ_{it}^c and unobserved factor prices w_{Hit}, w_{Mit}. Hence, $u_{it}^{cc'}$ is a combination of unobservable supply shocks to c relative to c'. OLS estimates of 7 are therefore subject to simultaneity bias, for which we need a demand shifter as an instrument.

The parameter of interest in 7 is $\frac{\theta}{\lambda}$: the elasticity of substitution between commodities within the agricultural nest. This elasticity is large when productivity dispersion across fields goes to zero ($\theta \to \infty$) or when productivity is perfectly correlated across commodities ($\lambda \to 0$). When $\theta \to \infty$ there is no field heterogeneity remaining: all fields are on the margin when prices change so the county-level within-nest elasticity is high. When $\lambda \to 0$ the idiosyncratic shocks become perfectly correlated within nest $\mathcal{C}$, which lowers the variance of their differences, $\varepsilon_i^c(\omega) - \varepsilon_i^{c'}(\omega)$. Because these differences drive the idiosyncratic component of choices, their lower variance implies less heterogeneity for the within-nest choice margin and thus a high within-nest elasticity.

Across-nest substitution elasticities. Consider the odds ratio between nest $\mathcal{C}$ and $\mathcal{N}$,

$$\ln\left(\frac{\pi_{it}^{\mathcal{C}}}{\pi_{it}^{\mathcal{N}}}\right) = \lambda \ln\left(P_{it}^{\mathcal{C}}\right) + u_{it}^{\mathcal{N}}, \quad \text{with } P_{it}^{\mathcal{C}} \equiv \sum_{c\in\mathcal{C}} \left(r_{it}^c\right)^{\frac{\theta}{\lambda}} \text{ and } u_{it}^{\mathcal{N}} \equiv -\theta \ln\left(A_{it}^{\mathcal{N}}\right). \tag{8}$$

Note $\ln P_{it}^{\mathcal{C}}$ is the inclusive value of the agricultural nest and $u_{it}^{\mathcal{N}}$ is an unobservable supply shifter of agricultural land relative to forested land, which maps to the (unobserved) payoff to natural use $A_{it}^{\mathcal{N}}$. The parameter of interest is λ, the substitution elasticity across nests, i.e., the deforestation elasticity. As $\lambda \to 0$ the within-nest heterogeneity falls, as explained in the previous paragraph. Therefore, fields become relatively more heterogeneous in the across-nest margin, leading to a low across-nest elasticity. Given $\frac{\theta}{\lambda}$ from 7, we can construct the inclusive value in 8 and λ is identified (see Appendix C.2 for details).

Estimation sample. I use county-level data from agricultural censuses of Brazil (1995, 2006, 2017) and Argentina (2002, 2008, 2018). The commodities considered are beef (pasture), soybean, maize, wheat, rice, sunflower, sugarcane. Beef, maize, and soybean represent 85% of all agricultural land, while the other commodities are jointly less than 10%.

Factor shares. I take factor shares from the literature since they have been estimated for South American countries (Sotelo, 2020; Pellegrina, 2022). Land intensities for major crops (maize, soybean, wheat) range from 0.4-0.6, while values for beef are between 0.5-0.7.

Instruments. OLS estimates of 7 will be biased towards zero due to simultaneity bias, because the unobservable supply shocks will be correlated with relative land shares and relative payoffs. The appropriate instrument is a demand shifter varying at the county-year it and commodity-pair cc' level. To construct such an instrument, I first define a demand shifter for commodity c as $IV_{it}^{c} = \sum_j s_{ij}^{c} d_{jt}^{c}$, where s_{ij}^{c} is the share of commodity c output from county i that historically goes to destination j and d_{jt}^{c} is a time-varying measure of demand conditions in destination j.[10] Intuitively, if demand conditions for crop c increase in destination j, the counties that historically supplied j are more exposed and receive a larger demand shock. The relevance of the instrument relies on persistence in the sourcing relationships between downstream consumer markets and upstream producers, as mediated by the agribusiness firms, which is ultimately confirmed via the first-stage F-statistic in the results. Finally, I define a relative demand shifter between two commodities c and c' as $IV_{it}^{cc'} \equiv IV_{it}^{c}/IV_{it}^{c'}$. The identifying assumption is that the county's relative exposure is uncorrelated with *changes* in the error term, $\Delta u_{it}^{cc'}$, whereas correlation with *levels* $u_{it}^{cc'}$ is allowed. We also need an instrument for equation 8 for the same reasons as for equation 7: if the unobserved payoff to natural use increases, then the commodity nest's share would fall and its price index $P_{it}^{\mathcal{C}}$ would increase, biasing the estimate of λ towards zero. We now need a shifter of demand for agriculture overall, which we construct by aggregating the demand shifters across all commodities, $IV_{it}^{\mathcal{C}} \equiv \sum_{c\in\mathcal{C}} IV_{it}^{c}$.

Frontier region definition. I allow heterogeneity in substitution parameters across "frontier" and "core" agricultural regions. I do this to allow my land use change estimates to be comparable to the subset of studies focusing exclusively on the Amazon region. Hence, I define the frontier region for Brazil as the government-designated area of "Amazonia Legal". The definition of core region for Argentina is based on the "zona núcleo" designation from agricultural censuses, which consists of the "Pampeana" region.

Results. The upper panel of Table 3 shows OLS and IV estimates for $\frac{\theta}{\lambda}$, the substitution elasticity between commodities. The lower panel shows estimates for λ, the deforestation elasticity. Note the within-nest estimates are in line with values from the agricultural

[10] For the construction of the instruments, the destination markets are all those in the TRASE data, which consists of over 190 countries from all continents, which are aggregated into 7 trading blocs: Asia, Europe, Africa, Middle East, Central America, South America, and North America. I use destination j's imports from every nation except Argentina and Brazil as the demand measure d_{jt}^{c}, thus purging away supply-side effects in Argentina and Brazil that directly affect the imports of j.

trade literature, which typically finds substitution elasticities across commodities ranging between 1.5-4 (Costinot et al., 2016; Sotelo, 2020; Pellegrina, 2022). The last two columns add interactions with a frontier region indicator to allow for spatial heterogeneity: the negative sign suggests that farmers in frontier regions are less responsive to price changes along both within- and across-nest margins.

Table 3: Supply-side substitution parameters.

Within-nest substitution elasticity	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
$\frac{\theta}{\lambda}$	0.201***	2.220***	0.164***	2.219***
	(0.034)	(0.144)	(0.035)	(0.143)
$\frac{\theta}{\lambda}$ × frontier region			0.725***	-1.106***
			(0.123)	(0.180)
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Location FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	7,008	7,008	7,008	7,008
KP-Wald First stage F-statistic		171.2		176.6

Across-nest substitution elasticity	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
λ	0.052***	0.279***	0.052***	0.281***
	(0.009)	(0.068)	(0.010)	(0.069)
λ × frontier region			0.002	-0.229**
			(0.031)	(0.076)
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Location FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	9,255	9,255	9,255	9,255
KP-Wald First stage F-statistic		143.4		151.4

Notes: table shows estimates for equations 7-8 in upper and lower panel, respectively. SE clustered at county-level.

While I cannot fully disentangle the micro-foundations driving the regional heterogeneity, most mechanisms are likely related to frontier regions being less developed overall. Farmers in these regions may find it harder to switch between commodities due to poorly functioning input markets (machinery, credit), thus rationalizing lower within-nest substitution. The lower across-nest response to commodity prices is consistent with deforestation in frontier areas being driven relatively more by non-market forces, most notably land grabbing incentives.

5.2 Markdowns

As indicated by 4, markdowns μ_{it}^{c} are a function of the price-elasticity of supply and the number of firms sourcing from each location. Hence, we can compute markdowns before imposing the demand side of the model.[11] Figure 3-A shows the geography of markdowns for the beef cattle sector, the main driver of land use. Average markdowns are 0.74 for beef, and 0.86 and 0.87 for maize and soybeans. Markdowns are wider in frontier regions where supply is least elastic (Brazil's north, Argentina's west), likely due to the reasons explained in the preceding section.

Figure 3: Spatial distribution of markdowns and correlation with local observables.



Notes: all plots are constructed from county-level markdown estimates, market access terms, and carbon intensities. Markdowns are computed using 4 and 9 and averaged over time. Market access is constructed as $\sum_j s_j d_{ij}^{-1}$ where d_{ij} is distance between county i-hub j and s_j is hub trade volume. Carbon intensity is measured as tonnes carbon/hectare. For the scatterplot, curves are fitted polynomials of county-level observations and markers are binned scatter plots. All results are for upstream beef markets. Additional results for soybean and maize are displayed in Appendix C.3.2.

Panels B and C of Figure 3 show frontier regions are indeed more remote (as measured by market access) and more emissions-intense (as measured by the carbon density of

[11] The price-elasticity of supply is derived from 3 and is computed with the following objects: substitution parameters (θ, λ), land intensity parameters (γ_L^c), and observed land use shares $(\pi_{it}^{c|\mathcal{C}}, \pi_{it}^{\mathcal{C}})$ as,

$$\frac{\partial \ln Q_{it}^{c}}{\partial \ln p_{it}^{c}} = \left[\left(\frac{\theta}{\lambda} - 1 \right) \left(1 - \pi_{it}^{c|\mathcal{C}} \right) + (\theta - 1) \pi_{it}^{c|\mathcal{C}} \left(1 - \pi_{it}^{\mathcal{C}} \right) \right] \frac{1}{\gamma_L^c} + \left(\frac{1}{\gamma_L^c} - 1 \right). \tag{9}$$

land). Most importantly, the positive correlation between the two market distortions—market power and the environmental externality—will play a significant role in the policy analysis of section 6. Finally, in Appendix C.3.3 I validate the model-implied markdowns against external accounting-based markdowns. The key takeaway is that model-implied markdowns are positively correlated across space with external markdowns. If external markdowns are to some degree indicative of market power, then the fact that the model-implied markdowns move in the same direction across space is reassuring.

5.3 Demand elasticities

First, the lower-level elasticity η_l is identified from expenditure variation across source origins i within a source nation n:

$$\ln\left(\frac{X^c_{ijt}}{X^c_{njt}}\right) = (1-\eta_l)\ln\left(p^c_{ijt}\right) + \lambda^c_{njt} + \varepsilon^c_{ijt} \quad \forall i \in n, \tag{10}$$

where X^c_{ijt} is destination j's expenditure on commodity c from county i, $X^c_{njt} = \sum_{i' \in n} X^c_{i'jt}$, $\lambda^c_{njt} \equiv -\ln\left(\sum_{i' \in n} a^c_{i'jt}(p^c_{i'jt})^{1-\eta_l}\right)$ is a commodity-source nation-destination-time fixed effect and $\varepsilon^c_{ijt} \equiv \ln\left(a^c_{ijt}\right)$. Because 10 is a demand equation, simultaneity bias arises when estimating via OLS. Therefore, I instrument for price with a supply shifter which I construct as $IV^c_{ijt} \equiv s^c_{ij} \times b_{nt}$, where b_{nt} is a weather shock at the origin nation (measured as deviations from historical average) and s^c_{ij} is the share of origin i production going to destination j in the first year of the sample. The instrument's relevance condition is straightforward: given a negative weather shock at the origin, the size of the supply shock faced by destination j depends on how exposed it is to i through its historic trading relationship. The exclusion restriction is that the origin-destination shares s^c_{ij} are not predictive of changes in unobservable demand shocks. This allows an origin i that historically exports most of its output to j to consistently experience large demand shocks from j, but not to experience systematic *changes* in such shocks over time. The middle-level elasticity η_m is identified from expenditure variation across nations,

$$\ln\left(\frac{X^c_{njt}}{X^c_{jt}}\right) = (1-\eta_m)\ln\left(P^c_{njt}\right) + \lambda^c_{jt} + \varepsilon^c_{njt}, \tag{11}$$

where X^c_{jt} is destination j's total expenditure on commodity c across all source nations. The term $\lambda^c_{jt} \equiv -\ln\left(\sum_{n'} a^c_{n'jt}(P^c_{n'jt})^{1-\eta_m}\right)$ is a commodity-destination-time fixed effect and $\varepsilon^c_{njt} \equiv \ln\left(a^c_{njt}\right)$. To construct the price indices in 11 I use the residuals from 10, i.e., $P^c_{njt} \equiv \left(\sum_{i\in n} \hat{a}^c_{ijt}\left(p^c_{ijt}\right)^{1-\eta_l}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta_l}}$ where $\hat{a}^c_{ijt} = \exp\left(\hat{\varepsilon}^c_{ijt}\right)$. Since 11 is a demand equation just like 10, the simultaneity problem and its solution are the same, with the only difference being the lower geographic resolution (origin locations are now nations instead of counties). Hence, I again instrument for price by constructing a supply shifter, however at the origin nation level. Finally, the upper-level elasticity η_u is identified from expenditure variation across commodities,

$$\ln\left(\frac{X^c_{jt}}{X_{jt}}\right) = (1-\eta_u)\ln\left(P^c_{jt}\right) + \lambda_{jt} + \varepsilon^c_{jt}, \tag{12}$$

where X_{jt} is destination j's total expenditure on agricultural imports. To construct the price indices in 12 I use the residuals from 11, i.e, $P^c_{jt} \equiv \left(\sum_n \hat{a}^c_{njt}\left(P^c_{njt}\right)^{1-\eta_m}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta_m}}$ where $\hat{a}^c_{njt} = \exp\left(\hat{\varepsilon}^c_{njt}\right)$. Furthermore, $\lambda_{jt} \equiv -\ln\left(\sum_{c'} a^{c'}_{jt}\left(P^{c'}_{jt}\right)^{1-\eta_u}\right)$ is a destination-time fixed effect and $\hat{a}^c_{jt} = \exp\left(\varepsilon^c_{jt}\right)$. The required instrument is now a supply shifter varying across commodities, which I construct as supply shocks at the destination-commodity level as $IV^c_{jt} = \sum_n s^c_{nj} b_{nt}$, where s^c_{nj} is the share of destination j imports coming from an origin nation n in a baseline year and b_{nt} is the origin nation-level weather shock.

Results. Table 4 shows the substitution elasticity estimates for each level of the demand system. At all levels, IV estimates are larger in absolute value than OLS estimates, consistent with simultaneity bias. Substitutability is higher across commodity sources than across commodities, and across counties than across nations. At the nation and commodity levels, the implied CES parameter values are $\eta_m = 5.99$ and $\eta_u = 5.11$. These magnitudes are similar to those from related literature (Costinot et al., 2016), with deviations likely driven by differences in the set of commodities and countries.

Table 4: Demand substitution elasticities.

	Dependent variable: log (expenditure share)					
	Lower level (across counties)		Middle level (across nations)		Upper level (across commodities)	
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
log (price)	1.266***	-8.641***	-1.478***	-4.992***	-1.030***	-4.107**
	(0.020)	(0.691)	(0.079)	(0.772)	(0.163)	(1.173)
KP-Wald First stage F-statistic		257		32		9
Observations	409,558	409,558	38,272	38,272	4,059	4,059

Notes: Lower, middle, and upper specifications include origin nation-destination-year-commodity fixed effects, destination-year-commodity fixed effects, and destination-year fixed effects, respectively. SE clustered by origin-destination (for lower and middle levels) or destination (for upper level).

5.3.1 Additional parameters and simulation details

The remaining parameters are either observed in the data (land endowment $\overline{L}_i$, population $\overline{H}_i$, non-agricultural wages $\underline{w}_{Hit}$, intermediate input prices w_{Mt}), taken from the literature (factor shares γ_L, γ_H, γ_M, across-sector labor supply elasticity ψ), or calibrated (unobservable land productivity ζ^c_{it}, trade costs τ_{ij}). Implementation details for these parameters, as well as for equilibrium simulations, can be found in Appendix D.1.

6 Policy counterfactuals

The counterfactual analysis proceeds in three steps. Section 6.1 evaluates three stylized policies often proposed in the public debate in order to highlight the regulatory trade-off between targeting and scale. Section 6.2 re-runs the counterfactuals under different conduct assumptions to show how the trade-off is shaped by competition. Section 6.3 compares all policies in a full welfare analysis where the first-best is used as a benchmark.

6.1 The policy trade-off between targeting and scale

6.1.1 Downstream taxes: large scale but poor upstream targeting

This first policy counterfactual is a uniform downstream tax for each commodity (based on each commodity's average emissions footprint across upstream origins).[12] The motivation for this exercise is based on the notion that a commodity's upstream origin cannot be perfectly traced. Hence, this stylized counterfactual captures how well a regulator can do when constrained to commodity-specific but spatially-uniform downstream taxes.

Figure 4-A shows the impact of the downstream tax on upstream production (for the beef sector, the main driver of total emissions).[13] The figure plots the relationship between an upstream location's emissions intensity and its change in production: a negative relationship implies better targeting. First, the average impact on upstream production is large even when using a modest SCC of 50 USD/t CO_2e for the downstream tax. This is consistent with existing work, which finds that carbon taxes at even lower SCC values would nearly eliminate all agricultural land in the Amazon (Souza-Rodrigues, 2019). Second, while the policy has a large impact on average, it is bluntly targeted: output drops least in frontier regions where emissions intensities are highest. Mistargeting occurs because (i) supply is less elastic in frontier regions, and (ii) pass-through is lower in these regions because of the stronger degree of agribusiness market power. While this spatial mistargeting result holds regardless of conduct assumptions since it relies solely on the

[12] I implement the policy as a downstream retail tax (for goods consumed domestically) combined with a downstream export tax (on exported goods). Technically, it is implemented by setting an output tax $t^c_{ij} = t^c = SCC \times E^c \quad \forall i, j, c$ where E^c is the average tonnes of emissions per tonne of output for commodity c. The reason for having both a domestic and export tax is to shut down standard inefficiencies from consumption-side leakage: without the domestic tax, there would be consumption leakage to unregulated domestic consumers. Hence, fully regulating all consumer markets isolates inefficiencies from domestic mistargeting, which are the main focus of the paper. Appendix D.5.2 shows a version of this counterfactual where only a foreign trade partner implements this tax, which delivers similar issues of upstream targeting while also introducing consumption-side leakage (to domestic and foreign unregulated consumer markets).

[13] I focus on beef because it accounts for 70% of all agricultural land and its emissions footprint is orders of magnitude above that of crops. As a result, it is the main driver of aggregate emissions. I account for emissions from crops when discussing aggregate emissions in the welfare analysis of section 6.3.

spatial pattern of supply elasticities, market power exacerbates it by eroding pass-through most in locations where the environmental cost is highest. Beyond the limited effectiveness of the downstream tax, I also analyze its distributional effects. In Appendix D.5.1 I show that farmer income is implicitly taxed at a higher rate in poorer regions, i.e., the policy is regressive across space. Hence, apart from increasing food prices for consumers, the downstream tax has an extra layer of regressivity on the supply side.

Figure 4: Targeting performance of downstream and upstream regulation.



Notes: scatter plots are constructed from upstream outcomes averaged to the state-level and for the beef sector. Marker sizes are proportional to baseline production. Lines indicate the fit of a linear model to the markers, with observations size-weighted by baseline production. The horizontal axis reports the emissions intensity of each upstream location (tonnes of CO_2e/tonne of output). The vertical axes report the percentage point change in upstream output as a result of each policy. Outcomes are reported for the default conduct assumption of imperfect competition and perfect competition.

6.1.2 Upstream regulation: effective upstream targeting but low scale

Recall the $A_i^{\mathcal{N}}$ term in the landowner choice problem is a residual: it captures any incentives farmers have to deforest that are not explained by changes in commodity prices. Hence, a change in $A_i^{\mathcal{N}}$ is consistent with any policy that is enforced upstream and changes incentives to deforest directly, rather than indirectly via commodity prices. Technically, I implement this section's policy as a forest subsidy that increases the $A_i^{\mathcal{N}}$ term for upstream locations in the top decile of emissions intensity. This differs from the previous downstream taxes in that it is directly implemented upstream on farmers. To ensure farmers don't just claim the subsidy without re-foresting, I assume the targeted benefits of this policy come at an enforcement cost that limits its scalability.[14] Figure 4-B plots the policy's impact on upstream production and its spatial correlation with emissions intensity. The contrasting slopes between panels A and B of Figure 4 indicate the upstream policy is well-targeted while the downstream tax is not. More subtly, the outcomes delivered by the upstream policy are similar with or without market power, which is not true for the downstream tax. Because of its direct implementation, the upstream policy avoids the pass-through distortions that market power introduces for the downstream tax.

6.1.3 Downstream taxes with certification: improving targeting while preserving scale

The previous two policies were at two extremes in terms of targeting assumptions: the upstream regulation was perfectly targeted but at small scale, while the downstream tax operated at large scale but without any targeting. We now consider an intermediate policy: a downstream tax that preserves scale while allowing coarse targeting at the macro-region level. Given there are only 10 of these large macro-regions, such a policy would only need to certify commodities by their coarse macro-region origin, rather than their precise county origin.[15] How well this coarse policy performs relative to finer county-level targeting depends on how much of the variation in market power and emissions intensities is across regions relative to within.

[14] The enforcement cost depends on the size of the conservation zone. For the purpose of this stylized counterfactual, the enforcement cost is thus contingent on the conservation zone being defined as counties in the top 10% of emissions intensity (which is based on typically observed coverage rates for priority-zone policies in this setting). The subsidy rate is set based on the average carbon intensity of land: a landowner in location i is paid $SCC \times e_i^{LUC}$ dollars per hectare of forest, where e_i^{LUC} is the location's CO_2e per hectare of land and SCC is the social cost of carbon.

[15] I implement this with an output tax $t_{ij}^c = t_{r(i)}^c = SCC \times E_{r(i)}^c \; \forall i, j, c$, where $E_{r(i)}^c$ is average tonnes of emissions per tonne of output in the macro-region r that county i belongs to. Hence, the tax varies by commodity and macro-region, but not within a macro-region.

Figure [5](#) plots the correlation between an upstream location's emissions intensity and its counterfactual change in production for (i) the uniform downstream tax, (ii) a macro-region targeted tax, and (iii) a county-level targeted tax. Macro-region targeting flips (and corrects) the correlation between emissions intensity and abatement. While county-level targeting naturally performs even better, the key takeaway is that even coarse macro-region certification makes a qualitative difference for targeting.

Figure 5: Coarse targeting flips the correlation between CO_2e intensity and abatement.



Notes: all plots are constructed from county-level outcomes for the beef sector. Markers are binned scatter plots and lines indicate fit to county-level outcomes. Horizontal axes report the emissions intensity of each upstream location (tonnes of CO_2e/tonne of output). Vertical axes report percentage point change in upstream output as a result of each policy. From left to right, results are shown for downstream taxes that are (i) untargeted, (ii) coarsely targeted by upstream region, and (iii) finely targeted by upstream county. In all figures, outcomes are reported for the default conduct assumption of imperfect competition.

6.2 The role of competition for the policy trade-off

The previous section suggests that when choosing among two policy alternatives, it is natural to compare the abatement benefits each tool delivers relative to its implementation cost. Let ΔE_U and ΔE_D denote the emissions reductions (in tonnes of CO_2e) achieved by the upstream regulation and the downstream tax, respectively. Moreover, define $\mathcal{T} \equiv \Delta E_U - \Delta E_D$ as the "targeting premium": the additional emissions reductions achieved by the upstream tool (targeted but small scale) relative to the downstream tool (large scale but non-targeted). Finally, let C denote the additional enforcement cost of the upstream tool relative to the downstream one. A regulator with the goal of maximizing abatement at minimal enforcement cost chooses the upstream tool if its dollar value of emissions reductions, net of additional enforcement costs, exceeds that of the downstream tool,

$$SCC \times \Delta E_U - C > SCC \times \Delta E_D \implies C < SCC \times \mathcal{T}. \tag{13}$$

The right hand side of 13 says the regulator chooses the targeted tool if its additional enforcement cost (C) is below a certain threshold: the dollar-value of the targeting premium, $SCC \times \mathcal{T}$. SCC is observable given it's a parameter that we incorporate exogenously into our analysis, and the targeting premium $\mathcal{T}$ is also observable because it's an outcome of the model simulations. Hence, while we do not observe enforcement costs C, we can compute an upper bound under which small-scale upstream regulation is preferred to a large-scale downstream tax.

Note $\mathcal{T}$ depends on model primitives such as the correlation between emissions intensity and market power: $\mathcal{T}$ is higher when this correlation is positive because that's when pass-through is lower to emissions-intense locations, worsening the downstream tax's effectiveness relative to upstream regulation. To illustrate this point, I use the model to compute $\mathcal{T}$ for varying degrees of spatial correlation, which involves the following steps:

1. Let the baseline spatial distribution of carbon density be the one observed in the data, denoted by a mean of μ and a standard deviation of σ.

2. Simulate the uniform downstream tax from section 6.1.1. Denote the emissions reductions it attains as $\Delta E_D(\sigma)$, given it depends on the carbon-density dispersion σ. Simulate the upstream policy from section 6.1.2 and denote its emissions reductions as $\Delta E_U(\sigma)$. Finally, compute the targeting premium, $\mathcal{T}(\sigma) \equiv \Delta E_U(\sigma) - \Delta E_D(\sigma)$.

3. Construct a mean-preserving spread (MPS) of the baseline distribution of carbon density: it also has mean μ but an alternative standard deviation denoted $\tilde{\sigma}$. Repeat step 2, computing the targeting premium under the MPS, $\mathcal{T}(\tilde{\sigma}) \equiv \Delta E_U(\tilde{\sigma}) - \Delta E_D(\tilde{\sigma})$. Repeat for various MPS, i.e., for various values of $\tilde{\sigma}$.

Figure 6-A shows $\mathcal{T}(\tilde{\sigma})$ is increasing in $\tilde{\sigma}$: the more heterogeneity in emissions intensity, the higher the value of targeting, and therefore the higher the enforcement cost society is willing to pay for targeting. Moreover, this value is higher when there is market power—upstream targeting is valuable not just because of the standard efficiency argument that holds under any kind of market structure, but also because it avoids the pass-through distortions that market power introduces for the downstream policy. Importantly, if the correlation between emissions intensity and market power had been of the opposite sign, then market power would have *improved* targeting by raising pass-through to emissions-intense locations (i.e., the solid line in Figure 6 would be below the dashed one). Thus, market power may worsen or improve an environmental policy's targeting depending on the direction in which it distorts pass-though, which in turns depends on how industry primitives shape the aforementioned correlation.

Figure 6: Interaction between emissions heterogeneity, market structure, and targeting.



Notes: the vertical axis shows the targeting premium $\mathcal{T}(\tilde{\sigma})$ for a given degree of emissions dispersion $\tilde{\sigma}$. The left panel reports the targeting premium in units of CO_2e, while the right panel reports its dollar value under a SCC of 50 USD/tonne. The horizontal axis in both figures shows the deviation of the counterfactual dispersion $\tilde{\sigma}$ from the observed degree of dispersion σ, reported as the ratio $\tilde{\sigma}/\sigma$.

These qualitative results add nuance to the classic intuition that by depressing quantities "the monopolist is the conservationist's friend" (Solow, 1974). While we can confirm this pro-environment intuition of market power by comparing the laissez-faire equilibrium with and without market power—indeed, forest cover is 25% higher when market power is present—the role of market power for the *transmission* of environmental policy is more ambiguous. In this setting, the empirical object that resolves this ambiguity is the sign of the spatial correlation between market power and the environmental externality.

6.3 Performance of feasible second-best policies relative to first-best

The previous section analyzed how emissions heterogeneity and market power interact to shape the trade-off between targeting and scale. To isolate core mechanisms, we focused on emissions reductions (net of enforcement costs) as the main policy goal. While this approach resonates with the notion of regulators being entrusted with narrow mandates rather than total welfare maximization, this section complements the preceding analysis by considering a broader welfare metric that accounts for producer and consumers surplus, as well as the government's fiscal balance. Moreover, I benchmark results against the first-best allocation, which I introduce next.

6.3.1 First-best benchmark

The equilibrium that results from a perfectly competitive setting with perfectly targeted Pigouvian taxes is the first-best efficient benchmark—there is no market power distortion and environmental damages are fully internalized. To characterize this allocation, I simulate the equilibrium under perfectly competitive conduct and with the following Pigouvian tax per unit of output and subsidy per unit of forested land:

$$t_i^{c*} = SCC \times e_i^{c,NLUC} \quad \text{and} \quad s_i^{\mathcal{N}*} = SCC \times e_i^{LUC}, \tag{14}$$

where $e_i^{c,NLUC}$ is CO_2e on-farm emissions per tonne of output (e.g., emissions from cattle methane) and e_i^{LUC} is CO_2e emissions per hectare of forested land. The output tax targets on-farm emissions (which vary by commodity) while the forest subsidy targets land use change emissions (independent of commodity). We label the allocation resulting from this equilibrium with superscript *. The Pigouvian output taxes derived in 14 will not decentralize the first best if we impose imperfectly competitive conduct instead. Hence, they need to be adjusted to account for market power. Let t_i^c be the output tax that decentralizes the first-best in the imperfectly competitive case. Appendix A.5 shows the expression for such a tax is $t_i^c = t_i^{c*} - p_i^{c^*}[1 - \mu_i^c(L_i^{c*})]$ where $\mu_i^c(L_i^{c*}) < 1$ is the markdown evaluated at the first-best land allocation L_i^{c*}. The takeaway is $t_i^c < t_i^{c*}$: the output tax is lower than under perfect competition because market power is already pushing quantities part of the way towards the first-best. This is the classic insight from Buchanan (1969) on optimally taxing a polluting monopolist.

6.3.2 Welfare analysis of second-best policies

I follow standard approaches from single-industry empirical IO studies by constructing welfare as the sum of its constituent parts (Fowlie et al., 2016; Hsiao, 2021). I define social welfare W as the sum of consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS), government surplus (G) and emissions (E) evaluated at the SCC, i.e., $W = CS + PS + G - SCC \times E$. Details on welfare accounting for each component are in Appendix D.4. Table 5 reports the welfare impact of each policy, as percentage point changes from the laissez-faire as well as share of the first-best efficiency gains.

First, within the category of downstream domestic taxes, emissions declines are larger the more finely targeted the policy is. Producer and consumer surplus declines are also smaller the more targeted the tax is. Both forces contribute to the larger welfare gains attained by finer targeting. In the case of unilateral tariffs by foreign trade partners, impacts on all welfare components are small due to consumption-side leakage. Moreover, surplus for South American consumers increases while that of foreign consumers declines. Second, moving on to upstream policies, the limited-scale but targeted forest subsidy delivers more emissions abatement than the untargeted downstream tax. However, once we

Table 5: Decomposition of welfare impacts.

	Change relative to laissez-faire equilibrium (percentage points)					% of first-best efficiency gains	
	Δ E	Δ PS	Δ CS	Δ CS_{SA}	Δ CS_{ROW}	Δ E	Δ W
Downstream domestic taxes							
– Untargeted (section 6.1.1)	-26.88	-21.49	-28.07	-28.55	-27.57	29.27	26.40
– Region-targeted (section 6.1.3)	-30.48	-20.74	-26.36	-27.12	-25.60	33.20	30.85
– County-targeted (section 6.1.3)	-34.47	-18.96	-23.43	-24.26	-22.59	37.54	35.99
Downstream foreign taxes							
– Unilateral EU tariff (appendix D.5.2)	-2.92	-2.44	-5.67	2.36	-13.80	3.18	2.44
Upstream policies							
– Forest subsidy (section 6.1.2)	-28.09	354.60	-0.10	-0.10	-0.10	30.60	32.55
– First best (section 6.3.1)	-91.81	853.99	-37.62	-38.09	-37.14	100.00	100.00

Notes: details on how each welfare component is computed are in Appendix D.4. CS_{SA} refers to consumer surplus of South America and CS_{ROW} to that of foreign consumers. The first five columns display percentage point changes between the policy counterfactual and the laissez-faire. The last two columns display the changes in emissions and overall welfare, as a percent of the changes delivered by the first-best. Percentage point changes for government surplus are not displayed because the baseline level for G in the laissez-faire is zero (however, government surplus does indeed enter ΔW).

allow for some targeting of the downstream tax, even as coarsely as by region, the upstream policy is outperformed in abatement terms. The forest subsidy generates smaller declines in consumer surplus than the downstream tax though, because it only targets production for farmers in the most emissions-intense areas. Producers also gain significantly because they are being paid to keep their land forested. Despite the transfer to producers, aggregate welfare gains are modest because the forest subsidy implies a large fiscal cost. Finally, the first best welfare gains come from large reductions in emissions damages as well as increases in producer surplus because they are subsidized to keep land forested. Both forces outweigh the decline in consumer surplus and the net fiscal cost of the forest subsidies. Overall, the range of second-best policies I consider attain between 29-38% of first-best emissions reductions and 26-36% of welfare gains.

7 Final remarks

Environmental externalities often co-exist with other distortions in real world markets. In this paper, I study how the transmission of environmental policy occurs along a supply chain, in particular when pre-existing distortions lie between the stage where emissions are generated and the stage where regulation is feasible. I do so in the empirical context of an agricultural supply chain, where the link between upstream farmers and downstream consumers is intermediated by a concentrated layer of agribusiness intermediaries with plausible monopsony power. While policy interventions are more feasibly implemented at the supply chain's bottleneck, I show that the impact on the upstream producers making the environmentally-relevant decisions can be poorly targeted, and especially so when market power is present. Concretely, if the upstream producers most subject to market power are also the most emissions-intense, then the Pigouvian signal of a downstream tax is eroded most where social cost is highest.

More generally, market power can be theoretically ambiguous for the transmission of environmental policy, and this paper proposes a specific mechanism—differential pass-through–that microfounds this ambiguity. Moreover, the empirical object that resolves this theoretical ambiguity is the correlation between market power and the environmental externality. In this setting, market power worsens targeting because the correlation is positive. In other settings the correlation could be negative, in which case market power would improve targeting by raising Pigouvian pass-through where social cost is highest. Understanding how specific industries vary in the primitives shaping such correlations can help reveal general insights about the efficiency of corrective policies.

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